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1Preface
The question of how EC law affects National law is a complex, interesting and
delicate question. This can only be solved by clearly understanding the
relationship between Community law and those of the Member States, which is
also intricate and complex. Since the foundation of the doctrine of direct effect
and supremacy is established by the ECJ in the 1960s, there have been plentiful
academic literatures written about the relationship between EC law and National
law. In practice, a string of important cases concerning this matter have been
decided by the European Court of Justice. Therefore, we must naturally accept
that it is not a very new issue in EC law. However, it could hardly be said that it is
obsolete, since controversies have been continued to happen through the process
of European integration and enlargement. Scholars, the ECJ and the Member
States still have some divergences in their points of view. Consequently, this issue
is still a fertile land for much discussion.
For a person who has a first and very short time to study EC law like me, it is a
great interesting to approach a new legal order, that is the legal order of EC law,
of international law. In my situation, I dare not have any ambition to make
invention. The purpose of this thesis is to learn generally the nature of EC law by
combining, systemizing and analyzing opinions of scholars as well as that the ECJ.
Shortcomings are inevitable due to my limited knowledge and time for doing it.
However, I hope that I shall be able to draw a general picture about the nature of
EC law after finishing this thesis.
I am indebted to SIDA (Swedish International Development Cooperation
Agency) that gave me an invaluable chance to study in Sweden. I would like to
thank to the Faculty of Law of Lund University that helped me so much during my
studying in Lund, and to all of the Professors as well as staffs here. Especially, I
am very much grateful to Professor Peter Gjötler, my supervisor, who was very
patient to offer kind helps to me to finish this thesis.
Luu Quoc Thai
Lund,
May 2002
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31 Introduction
The political and economic bases of the European Community have made it more
specific characteristics, that it is based on the consents of the Member States for
the common objectives. The EEC founders’ objectives for the Community
included laying the “foundation for an ever-closer union among the people of
Europe” and ensuring the “economic and social progress of their countries by
common actions to eliminate the barriers divide Europe”.1 The goals were to be
accomplished by introducing the free movement of goods, persons, services, and
capital.2 The resulting Community, while possessing many attributes characteristic
of traditional international organizations, also contains the mechanism for
enforcement of EC law.3 Such a system, however, presupposes an effective
regime for implementation an enforcement that is more characteristic of a nation-
state than an international organization. In fact it is considered as a supranational
organization which requires particular relationship between its law and those of
the Member States.4 In turn, the relationship between Community law and
National law is characterized by the application and enforcement of Community
law in the Member States. The most important features of this relationship are the
direct effectiveness of Community law in the national courts, the supremacy of
Community law over national law and the procedures by which Community law
can be enforced in the Member States.5 In other words, the impact of Community
law upon the laws of the Member States depends on two principles: the direct
effect and supremacy of Community law. The former is relevant to
implementation, the later to the enforcement of Community law.6
Undoubtedly, to attain the Community’s objectives, EC law must be applied
uniformly in all Member States. It means that Community law must have the same
meaning and effect: it would be wrong if Community law had greater effect in one
                                                
1 See the Preamble of Treaty Establishing the European Community, Fe. 7, 1992, O.J. (C224)
1.
2 Article 3(1) (c) EC Treaty.
3 For example, Article 177 (now 234) provides the preliminary rulings given by the ECJ to
assist  national courts in making judgment; Article 169 (now 226) provides the enforcement
procedure brought by the Commission against Member States. Indeed, the core of
Community law is formed by the rules for the establishment and maintenance of a common
market. Therefore, those Community rules the object of which is the establishment and
functioning of the common market cannot, upon closer analysis, be reduced exclusively to
mutual rights and duties of the Member States, as is often the case in traditional
international law. See P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat – Introduction to the
Law of the European Communities; Kluwer Law International; London – The Hague –
Boston, 1998, p. 78.
4 T.C. Hartley – The Foundation of European Community Law, Oxford University press, 4th
Ed., 1998, p.185.
5 Ibid.
6 D. Lasok & J. W. Bridge, Law and Institutions of the European Communities, London –
Butterworths, 1987, p. 301.
4country than in another. And because the enforcement of Community law “is
largely done by national authorities and courts”,7 this in turn requires the ultimate
authority to decide these questions should reside in a single court whose
jurisdiction extends over the whole Community. The only such court in existence
is the ECJ.8
It also follows from these premises that Community law must override national
law in the case of conflict. If there was not so, Member States could avoid the
application of Community rules disadvantageous to their interest by the simple
expedient of passing conflicting legislation. If the Community were required to rely
on notions of comity and reciprocity, Member States could also easily circumvent
or even disregard EC-imposed rules and obligations.9 But if Community law is
directly effective, an essential characteristic of a supranational system, the
Community Court must have the final ruling with regard to its validity and
interpretation. Community law would be useless if it could not be effectively
applied and enforced in Member States, it would prevent individuals with a right
under Community law – or an interest in its application – from bringing
proceedings in national courts and those make use of national legal remedies to
enforce it. Inevitably, the direct effect and supremacy of Community law over
national law, as has been regarded as the most important features of the
relationship between EC law and national law10, must be accepted within the
whole Community. In this thesis, I would like to confine my studying within the
two principles which feature the relationship between EC law and National law,
those are direct effect and supremacy of EC law. I shall also mention the indirect
effect doctrine, which has a very close connection with the direct effect in order to
understand comprehensively how the EC law impacts on National legislation.
                                                
7 John Temple Lang has noted that “the enforcement of Community law is largely done by
national authorities and courts. There is no other way it could be done. The Commission
is far too small to do it. Far more than any confederation, the Community relies on the
authorities of its Member States to carry out its law and policies”. See John Temple Lang,
The Duties of National Authorities under Constitutional Law, 23 ELRev., 1998, 109.
8 T.C. Hartley, supra  note 4.
9 Eric F. Hinton, Strengthening the Effectiveness of Community Law: Direct Effect, Article 5
EC, and the European Court of Justice, International Law and Politics, Vol. 31:307, p. 314.
10 T.C. Hartley, supra  note 4.
52 The Direct Effect of
Community law
2.1 Introduction
The impact of EC law on the legal system of the Member States is one of the
most significant of its features. The European Community has developed into an
organization of states with a relatively autonomous legal system, a system of
norms which bind each of the states and which has been internalized – in many
cases without national implementing measures – into the domestic systems of the
different states as a fairly uniform body of law.11 Direct effect can be provisionally
defined as the capacity of a norm of Community law to be applied in domestic
court proceedings. That is the capacity of a provision of Community law to create
individual rights enforceable by all persons concerned in the national courts.12 In
its early case law, Van Gen en Loos13, the ECJ stated that the Community
constitutes a new legal order of international law for the benefits of which the
states have limited their sovereign rights, albeit within limited fields, and the
subjects of which comprise not only Member States but also their nationals. The
ECJ has consistently outlined what has been known as the “direct effect”.14 The
basis of direct effect lies in the idea of new legal order. Community law has its
subject not only the Member States but also their nationals. The Community legal
order confers directly on interested parties individual rights which they can invoke
on their own behalf.15
                                                
11 Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca – EU Law – Text, Cases and Materials – Oxford
University Press, 2nd ed., 1998, P.164.
12 See for instance Case 57/65 Lüttike v. Hauptzollamt Saarlouis [1966] ECR 205; Case 41/74
Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337. In cases concerning directives, the ECJ uses a
different formula, i.e. ’that the provisions may be relied upon by an individual against any
national provision…’ See Case 8/81 Becker v. Finanzamt Münster-Innenstadt [1982] ECR
53.
13 Case 26/62 - Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse tariefcommissie [1962] ECR 1, [1963]
CMLR 105.
14 There has been much discussion of differences in meaning between ‘direct effect’ and
‘direct applicability’, although they have been used interchangeably in literatures and in the
ECJ’s case law (Case 2/74 Reyners [1974] ECR 631, Case 17/81 Pabst [1982] ECR 1331, Case
104/81 Kupferberg  [1982] ECR 3641). The difference between the two concepts is that direct
effect needs to confer rights on individuals but direct applicability need not, e.g. Article 234
(ex 177) EC Treaty can be directly applicable but not giving rise to rights in individuals. In
fact the differences do not have much practical importance. For more details, see T. Winter,
Direct Applicability and Direct Effect: Two Distinct and Different Concepts in Community
Law, 9 CMLRev. 425, 1972; S. Prechal, Directives in European Community Law, Oxford
University Press 1995, 260-4. I do not propose to discuss the distinction.
15 S. Prechal & Noreen Burrows, Gender Discrimination Law of the European Community,
Darmouth 1990, p. 27.
62.2 The Criteria of Direct Effect
Through its early case law, The ECJ has developed the specific conditions for
direct effect in the context of reference from national courts. The usual questions
were that whether private parties could rely on various provisions of the EC
Treaty in the national courts against national authorities16. Apart from the
provisions of the Treaties, other measures of the Community (such as regulations,
directives and decisions as well as International agreements binding the
Community), after 1970 have also been considered having direct effect in the
standards of direct effect set out by the court. Concretely, a provision of EC law
can have direct effect if it meets all specific conditions as below:
2.2.1 Clear and Precise
The condition can be understood that the content of the obligations imposed on
the Member States must be clear and precise. This condition need not exclude
the direct effect of provision whose interpretation caused difficulties. Neither the
complexity of the wording of the provision17 nor the fact that a provision involves
the evaluation economic factors18 need be an obstacle to the provision having
direct effect. If the idea is that the same Community goals should be pursued
similarly in all states must be appreciating the precise scope and meaning of the
provision of Community law in question, so that they may be applied to the
context of the case in which they are pleaded. If a provision is vague, e.g. it set
out only a very general aim which need further implementing measures to be made
concrete and clear, then it is difficult to accord direct effect to that provision and
allow its direct application by a national court19. A provision is not sufficiently
precise when it is so vague that the national court is not able to apply it without
dealing with questions beyond its competence, such as the economic policy to be
pursued.20 A relevant example of such a provision is Article 10 (formerly Article
5) of EC treaty, which states:
“Member States shall take all appropriate measure, whether general or
particular, to ensure fulfillment of the obligations arising out of this treaty or
resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. They shall
facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. They shall abstain from
any measure which could jeopardize the attainment of the objectives of this
Treaty.”
In one hand, its interpretation and application by different national courts in
different states would be likely to differ, thus undermining the uniform pursuit of
                                                
16 P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat, supra  note 3, P.529.
17 Case 6/64 Costa v. Enel [1964] ECR 585 at 597 – 598.
18 Case 27/67 Firma Fink – Fruchht GmbH v. Hauptzollant Muchen Landsbergertan [1968]
ECR 223 at 232.
19 Paul Craig & Grainne De Búrca, supra note 11, P.168.
20 S. Prechal & Noreen Burrows, supra note 15, p. 28.
7the same goals. And in the other hand, if the national courts were to flesh out a
provision which clearly required further elaboration or discretion in its
implementation, those courts would be usurping the political discretion of which
ever authority – be it the Member States or one of the Community institutions was
entrusted with the power of implementing that provision.21
In case Firma Fink22, the Court had to consider indefinite legal concept such as
“similar products” and “indirect protection” in interpreting and applying Article 95
EC23.  Therefore, if the concepts contained in a provision leave the Member
States a certain discretion in their application, then such a provision will not have
direct effect. In case Salgoil24 the Court concluded that a number of concepts
used in Article 33(1) and (2)25, such as “national production” or “total value”,
contained a certain margin of discretion because as the Treaty gave no indication
of the data to be used in calculating these concepts or of the methods to be
applied, several solutions could be envisaged. The national court is, of course,
able to examine whether the margin of discretion has been exceeded.26 The
distinction between indefinite legal concepts and concepts which imply a policy
discretion will be discussed under the third condition of direct effect.
2.2.2 Unconditional
The wording of the provision must make the obligation unconditional and
unqualified. In case Van Gend en Loos27 the Court set out certain criteria for the
direct effect of a Treaty provisions:
“ The wording of Article 12 (now 25) contains a clear and unconditional
prohibition which is not positive but negative obligation. This obligation is not,
moreover, qualified by any reservation on the part of states which would
make its implementation conditional upon a positive legislative measure
enacted under national law. The very nature of this prohibition makes it ideally
                                                
21 See e.g. the arguments of the German government submitted to the Court in case 8/81 –
Becker v. Finanzamt Münster – Innenstadt [1982] ECR 53, [1982] CMLR 449.
22 Case 27/67 Firma Fink – Fruchht GmbH v. Hauptzollant Muchen Landsbergertan [1968]
ECR 223 at 232.
23 Article 95 now is Article 90 EC, provides that  “No member state shall impose, directly or
indirectly, on the products of other member states any internal  taxation of any kind in
excess of that imposed directly or indirectly on similar domestic products.
Furthermore, no member state shall impose on the products of other member states any
internal taxation of such a nature as to afford indirect protection to other products.”
24 Case 13/68 – SPA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453 at 461.
25 Article 33 has been repealed by the Treaty of Amsterdam.
26 See case 51/76 – Verbond Van Nederlandse Ondernemingen v. Inspecteur Des
Invoerrechten Accijnzen [1977] ECR 113 at 125 – 127, in relation to the margin of discretion
relating to the term “capital goods” in Article 17 of the Second VAT Direcive – O.J. English
Special Edition 1967, p. 16.
27 Case 26/62 - Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse tariefcommissie [1962] ECR 1, [1963]
CMLR 105.
8adapted to produce direct effects in the legal relationship between member
states and their subjects.
The implementation of Article 12 (now 25) does not require any legislative
intervention on the part of the states. The fact that under this Article it is the
Member States who are made the subject of the negative obligation does not
imply that their national does not benefit from this obligation…”
However, a Community provision will not be prevented from being directly
effective merely because the rights it grants are dependent on some objective
factors or events. Once the condition is satisfied there is no further obstacle to
direct effect.28
The requirement of unconditionality means that the right must not be dependent on
something within the control of some independent authorities, such as Community
Institutions, or the Member State itself.29 Of course it must not be dependent on
the judgment or discretion of any such body. For example, a situation where a
judgment or discretion of a Community institution is involved can be seen in
Article 87 – 89 (formerly 92 – 94) EC concerning state aids. This is stated by
Article 87(1) (formerly 92(1)) that to be “incompatible with the common market”
where state aids affect trade between Member States. However, Article 88(2)
(formerly 93(2)) allows the Commission to decide whether any such aid infringes
the provision of Article 87 (formerly 92) and to order the offending Member
State terminate it within a period of time laid down by the Commission. This
situation can also be viewed in Article 88(2) (formerly 93(2)): the Council is
allowed to authorize any aid which might otherwise be regarded as contrary to the
Treaty. In this view, Article 87(1) (formerly 92(1)) can not be directly effective:
the prohibition it contains is conditional on the decision of the Council and the
Commission.30
2.2.3 The Absence of a Discretion in the Implementation of
Obligations
If the Community provision states that the rights it grants will come into effect
when further action of a legislative of executive nature has been taken by the
Community or the Member States, it would seem reasonable to hold that it can
                                                
28 This occurred at the end of the transitional period in relation to Article 52 (now 43), 59
(now 49) EC; see case 2/74 – Reyners v. Belgian State [1974] ECR 631 at 651 – 652, the ECJ
held at para. 30 of the judgment that “after the expiry of the transitional period the directives
provided for by the Chapter on the right of establishment have become superfluous with
regard to implementing the rule on nationality, since this is henceforth sanctioned by the
Treaty itself with direct effect”.
29 T.C. Hartley, supra note 4, p.192.
30 In case 77/72, [1973] ECR 6111 at para. 4 – 6, the Court held that at least as regards
systems of aids in operation at the time when the Treaty come to effect, Article 87(1)
(formerly 92(1)) is not directly effective in the absence of a decision under Article 88(2)
(formerly 93(2)).
9not have direct effect until that action is taken.31 The criterion of the absence of
discretion was clearly indicated in the judgment in Case 28/6732 and Case
13/6833. In the later judgment, the Court considered the direct effect of the last
sentence of Article 32, Article 33(1) and the first sub-paragraph of Article 33(2)
EC and looked, as the provisions consisted of positive obligations, “at question
whether the Member States may in their performing them exercise any discretion
such as to exclude the above mentioned effects wholly or in part”.34
An extreme example of an obligation dependent on the discretion of the Member
States would be a provision stating: “each member state shall, in so far as it
considers it desirable…”. So this obviously could not be directly effective. If the
Member State failed to take action in question, it could always argue that it did
not consider it desirable to do so. Another significant discretion is that which exist
where Community law requires the attainment of an objective but allows the
Member States to choose the means. If there are a number of quite different ways
in which the objective could be attained, the discretion given to the Member State
may prevent the provision from being directly effective. In this situation, discretion
only exist if not only is a choice of different views possible but also it is lawful to
follow any of them.35
An example for this situation is the Von Colson case36 in which the Court held
that, there were several ways in which Member States could fulfil the obligation to
provide a legal remedy for the victim of discrimination. Any effectiveness would
constitute compliance with the obligation, the discretion given to the Member
States consequently prevented the obligation from being directly effective.
The rulings of the ECJ on direct effect makes clear that, from the three conditions
discussed above, the absence of discretion of the Member States or Community
Institutions relating to the coming into force or application of the Treaty rule
concerned is the central condition. This element is involved in the discussion of
each of other criteria.37 Once the principle of direct effect was accepted, the
requirement that the obligation must be unconditional was considerably qualified,
the rule regarding negative obligations was dropped. However, the direct effect of
Community law can be relative in nature. Thus provisions may be dependent in
some respects on further elaboration in Community or National measures. That
does not prevent them having direct effect to the extent that they are not so
dependent.38
                                                
31 T.C. Hartley, supra  note 4, p.195.
32 Case 28/67 – Firma Molkerei - Zentrale Westfalen Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Paderborn  [1968] ECR 143 at 156.
33 Case 13/68 – SPA Salgoil v. Italian Ministry for Foreign Trade [1968] ECR 453 at 461.
34 P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat,  supra note 3, P.532.
35 Ibid.
36 Case 14/83 – Von Colson and Kamann v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen [1984] ECR 1891.
37 P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat, supra note 3 , P.533.
38 Ibid. See also Case 13/68 Salgoil [1968] ECR 453 at 461.
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2.3 The Nature of Direct Effect: a Duty to Apply
As mentioned above, direct effect can be provisionally defined as the capacity of
a norm of Community law to be applied in domestic court proceedings. At the
beginning, it was often defined as the creation of rights for individuals, which the
national courts must protect. However, the evolution of EC law has proved that,
direct effect should be much more than what had been defined.39 It is the capacity
of the norm to be invoked by individuals before national courts which are bound
to apply them. The reason for this shift was the gradual realization that many
norms of Community law, especially norms contained in Directives, thus not
having their object the attribution of a benefit to individuals, may very well serve
as a standard for reviewing the legality of Member States action when individual
can show a sufficient interest in the outcome of such a review.40
The case law41 of the ECJ showed that Treaty provisions (and sometimes-even
provisions of Decisions or Directives addressed to Member States) penetrate into
internal legal order without the aid of any national measure. Provisions of
Community law which imposes clear and precise, unconditional obligations and
leave the Community Institutions and the Member States no discretionary in their
application or implementation will be directly effective in that the National courts
can apply them, without stepping into the shoes of legislature.42 Such provisions
must be applied by national courts without the intervention of a legal measure
designed to transpose Community law into domestic law.43 Therefore, direct
effect really boils down, as far as courts are concerned, to a test of justifiability: is
the norm ‘sufficiently operational in itself to be applied by a court’ in a given case.
“Direct effect is the obligation of a court or another authority to apply a
relevant provision of Community law, either as a norm which governs the
case or as a standard for legal review”.44
The duty of Member States to apply Community provisions, as the core of direct
effect doctrine, has been developed through time by the ECJ. In Case Wilhelm et
al. v. Bundeskartellamt45 the Court held that the EC Treaty had ‘established its
                                                
39 In Case 26/62 - Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse tariefcommissie [1962] ECR 1, [1963]
CMLR 105, the ECJ held that “Article 12 of the establishing the European Economic
Community produces direct effect AND creates individual rights which national courts must
protect”. To some extents, this can be understood that the creation of individual rights does
not belong to direct effect, and direct effect requires the Member States to do more than
protect individual rights.
40Brunno De Witte, Direct effect, Supremacy, and The Nature of Legal Order, in Craig & De
Búrca, The evolution of EU law – Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 187.
41 E.g. Case 28/67 – Firma Molkerei - Zentrale Westfalen Lippe GmbH v. Hauptzollamt
Paderborn  [1968] ECR 143 at 152-154.
42 See Case 43/71 Paloti S.A.S v. Ministry of Finance of Italian Republic [1971] ECR 1039 at
1048 – 1049.
43 P.J.G. Kapteyn and P. Verloren Van Themaat, supra  note 3, P.84.
44 Prechal, S., Directives in European Community Law: A Study On EC Directives and their
Enforcement by National Courts, Oxford University Press, 1995.
45 Case 14/68 Wilhelm et al. v. Bundeskartellamt  [1969] ECR 1 at 14.
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own system of law, integrated into the legal systems of the Member States, and
which must be applied by their courts. It would be contrary to the nature of
such a system to allow Member States to introduce or to retain measures capable
of prejudicing the practical effectiveness of the Treaty. In Simmenthal II46 with
referring to the concept of direct effect, the Court ruled that ‘that the rules of
Community law must be fully and uniformly applied in all Member States
from the date of their entry into force and for so long as they continue in
force’ (emphasis added).  The existence of the doctrine of direct effect, until now,
is justified by the fact that the judicial enforcement of Community norms is still
different from that of national norms in certain respects. First, because the
existence of direct effect is a matter of interpretation of EC law to be settled by
the ECJ, rather than by the national courts separately; secondly, because there
are special categories of Community law containing norms which by themselves
seem sufficiently operational but which may not be enforced by national courts for
other reasons; thirdly, the fact that, the direct effect of Community law is an
obligation for a court or ‘another authority’ to apply Community norms.47
2.4 Community Provisions Capable of Direct
Effect
According to the criteria of direct effect mentioned above, provisions of
Community law shall have direct effect if they meet those criteria. Besides the
provisions of the Treaties, which are seen as the foundation or constitutional basic
of the community,48 there are various other sources of Community law may have
direct effect, such as regulations, decisions, directives, and agreements with third
countries.
v Regulations and Decisions
In the case of Regulations, there is no doubt that they should be capable of direct
effect and enforcement in National courts. Article 249 (formerly 189) EC
provides that Regulations ‘shall be binding in its entirely and directly applicable in
all Member States’. Policy consideration aside, this language seems to envisage
that regulations, at least, will immediately become part of domestic law of
Member States, and presumably that they may then be capable of being relied
upon by individuals in National courts, and subject to direct enforcement of these
courts.49 In Case Politi50 the Court held that:
                                                
46 Case 106/77 Administrazione delle Finanze dello stato v. Simmenthal SpA [1978] ECR 629
at 643.
47 Brunno De Witte, supra note 40, p. 188.
48 Case 294/83 Parti Ecologiste ’Lesverts’ v. Parliament [1986] ECR 1339, [1987] 2 CMLR
343, para. 3.
49 Craig & De Búrca, The evolution of EU law – Oxford University Press, 1998, p. 176.
50 Case 43/71 Politi v. Italian Minister of Finance [1971] ECR 1039.
12
“By reason of their nature and their function in the sources of Community law,
regulations have direct effect and are as such capable of creating individual
rights which national courts must protect”.
In Case Commission v. Italy51 the Court emphatically confirmed the direct effect
of regulations and criticized any attempt by a Member State to alter or dilute the
requirement of a Community regulation. Member States may not even to pass
implementing measure which might the consequence of limiting or altering the
effect of a regulation which must be enforced as it stands.52
However, a provision of a regulation may not have direct effect if it does not fulfil
the necessary criteria set out above, e.g. it is too vague or contingent upon action
by third party.53
Another of the forms of Community provisions listed under Article 249 (formerly
149) is the Decision. Generally, Decisions are more limited and specific
application than Regulations, because it is to be “binding in its entirely upon those
to whom it is addressed”. It means that a decision will not be a general measure,
but an individual one which is directed to a specific addressee. Despite the fact
that, unlike regulations, Article 249 (formerly 189) made no reference to the
Decisions’ ‘direct applicability’, the Court held that the decision was capable of
direct effect when it meet the criteria set out above. The reasoning of the Court
for the directly effective of decisions is the effectiveness of Community law. In
Case Grad54, the plaintiff sought to rely directly on a Council decision on VAT in
order to have a German law on transport tax declared incompatible with them.
The ECJ stated:
“Where … the Community authorities by mean of a decision have imposed an
obligation on a Member State… to act in a certain way, the effectiveness
(effet utile) of such a measure would be weakened if the nationals of that state
could not invoke it in the courts and the National courts could not take it into
consideration as part of Community law”
The direct effect of Decisions has been confirmed in the ECJ’s recent case law. In
Fleisch, the Court concluded that a decision addressed to a Member State could
be relied on as against that State where the provision in question imposed on its
addressee an obligation which was unconditional and sufficiently clear and
precise.55
v International Agreements
                                                
51 Case 39/72 Commission v. Italy [1973] ECR 101.
52 David A O Edward & Robert C. Lane, European Law – An Introduction, Butterworthe
Law of Society of Scotland, 1995, p. 61.
53 See case 131/79 R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs, ex parte Santillo [1980] ECR 15.
54 Case 9/70 Franz Grad v. Finanzamt Traunstein [1970] ECR 825.
55 Case C-156/91 Hansa Fleisch Ernst Mundt GmbH & Co. KG v. Landrat des Kreises
Schleswig-Flensburg  [1992] ECR I-5567.
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According to Article 281 (formerly 228) of the EC Treaty, the Community has
legal personality and is empowered to enter into contractual relation with other
person or organizations. Furthermore, Article 133 (formerly 113) and Article
310 (formerly 238) give the Community external power to enter particular
agreements with countries and organizations outside the Community itself. A
notable difference between International agreements and other measures of
Community law is that the formers are not included in the so-called “Community
secondary law” as provided by Article 249 EC. No where in the Treaty is the
applicability of such agreements mentioned save for only one provision in Article
300 EC paragraph 7, which states in general term that these agreements shall be
binding on the Institutions of the Community and on the Member States.
However, such Agreements may also be capable of direct effect. In
Kupferberg,56 where it was argued that German tax on wine could not apply to
imports from Portugal (before Portugal joined the Community) because it is
conflicted with a provision in the Free Trade Agreement between the Community
and Portugal. This raised the question whether the relevant provision of the Free
Trade Agreement was directly effective in Germany. The European Court held
that this question could no be left to the National law of each Member State
because a uniform solution throughout the Community was desirable. So
Community law had to decide, and the ECJ after examining the provision, held
that it was directly effective.57 The fact that it was probably not directly effective
in Portugal was regarded as irrelevant.58 The direct effect of international
agreements has been restated by the Court in Case Sevince59 and Bahia
Kziber60. The main reason for this direct effect is that agreements concluded
under the EC Treaty form an integral part of the Community legal system. Of
course, in order to be directly effective they must be satisfied the criteria set out
by the Court.
v Directives
Directives are always addressed to Member States. In principle, it prescribes a
particular result to be achieved by a particular date, leaving it to the Member
States in accordance with their own constitutional rules, to determine how and by
whom it should be implemented or “transposed” into national law.61 Article 249
(formerly 189) provides that a directive “shall be binding as to the result to be
achieved, upon each member state to which it is addressed, but shall leave to the
national authorities the choice of form and methods”. This provision makes
directives different from other measures as regulations, decisions… A directive
may leave some discretion to the Member States; it will always require further
                                                
56 See Case 104/81 Kupferberg  [1982] ECR 3641.
57 See also Case 12/86 Demirel [1987] ECR 2719; Case C-18/90 Kziber [1991] ECR I-3719.
58 Case 104/81 Kupferberg  [1982] ECR 3641, para. 18 of the Judgment.
59 Case C-192/89 S. Z. Sevence v. Staatssecretaris van Justice [1990] ECR I-3461.
60 Case C-18/90 Onem v. Kziber [1991] ECR I-199.
61 David A O Edward & Robert C. Lane, supra  note 52, p. 62.
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implementing measures according to the express term of Article 249 (formerly
189) and since it might only set out its aim in general terms, it may not be
sufficiently precise to allow for proper national judicial enforcement.62
However, the ECJ has consistently held that Directives are capable of having
direct effect. The controversy surrounding the direct effect of Directives was
finally resolved by the Court in Van Duyn.63 The Case concerned a Dutch
woman who wanted to enter the UK to take up a post with the Church of
Scientology. Scientology might be described as a ‘fringe religion’. When Miss
Van Duyn arrived in England, she was refused permission to enter, and this was
justified on the basis of public policy proviso. The ECJ was asked whether
Article 3(1) of Directive 64/22164 was directly effective. The purpose of this
Article is to limit the discretion of Member States when they invoke the public
policy proviso under Article 48 (now 39) EC, and Article 3(1) lays down that
such measures must be ‘based exclusively on the personal conduct of the
individual concerned’. It was argued on behalf of Miss Van Duyn that this
provision was directly effective and that she could therefore rely on it before
English court. The ECJ held that:
“ If … by virtue of the provisions of Article 189 (now 249) Regulations are
directly applicable and, consequently, may by very nature have direct effects,
it does not follow from this that other categories of acts mentioned in that
Article can never have similar effects. It would be incompatible with the
binding effect attributed to a directive by Article 189 (now 249) to exclude, in
principle, the possibility that the obligation which it imposes may be invoked
by those concerned.”
The ECJ, despite the fact that the concept of public policy is a discretionary
matter for Member States to decide, established that the exercise of that
discretion was restricted by a provision of the Directive which imposed a clear,
precise, and ‘complete’ obligation.65 The most important emphasis in Van Duyn
is the Court’s desire to make Directives an effective form of Community law, to
enable them to be enforced by national courts.
However, it was felt that directives were specifically intended to leave the
Member States with choices as how to enact a particular Community obligation,
and that the Court should not allow this to be overridden by individuals pleading
the provisions of the directives itself. Therefore, from its general reasoning in Van
Duyn, the Court added a more specific line of reasoning in later case, Ratti66.
The Case concerned two directives dealing with the packaging and labelling of
solvents and varnishes respectively. Mr. Ratti was an Italian who ran a firm
                                                
62 There is little doubt that the authors of the Treaties did not intend directives to be directly
effective. See the analysis of T. C. Hartley, supra note 4 , p. 210.
63 Case 41/71 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, [1975] 1 CMLR 1.
64 OJ 1963/64 (Spec. Ed.) 117.
65 See also Case C-72/95 [1996] ECR I-5403.
66 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1269.
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selling both solvents and varnishes in Italy. The firm decided that it would
package and label its products so as to comply with the two directives, even
though neither had been implemented in Italy. The matter, however, was covered
by an Italian law passed in 1963 which applied to both products. The
requirements of the Italian legislation on the matter were more stringent than
those under the Directives, providing penalties for those who failed to comply.
When the firm put its products on the market, Ratti was prosecuted for failure to
comply with the provisions of Italian law. At the relevant time, the deadline for
implementation of one of the directives had expired, but that for the other had
not. Ratti argued that his compliance with the directives was sufficient.
The ECJ, on a reference of the Italian court, held that a directive can become
directly effective only when the deadline for implementation has expired;
therefore, one of the directives in the case was directly effective but one was not.
The ECJ also held that this result was not affected  by the fact that some of the
varnishes had been imported from Germany which had already implemented the
second directive, and were therefore packaged and labelled in accordance with
it. This was the so-called ‘estoppel’ reasoning, based on the argument that their
failure to fulfil Treaty provision to implement a directive properly or on time
precluded the Member States from refusing to recognize its binding effect in
cases where it was pleaded against them.
To conclude the direct effect of Directives, the ECJ has used three arguments to
justify its reasons:67
First of all, there is an argument from general principle, the essence of which is
that it would be inconsistent with the binding effect of Directives to exclude the
possibility that they can confer rights. As stated in the ECJ’s judgment in Case
Van Duyn above, the mere fact that Regulations are deemed to be directly
applicable, and hence capable of conferring rights, should not be taken to mean
that other Community norms can never have the same effect.
Secondly, there is an argument from Article 177 (now 234). This Article allows
questions concerning the interpretation and validity of Community law referred by
national courts to the ECJ. From the generality of this provision, the Court has
concluded that questions relating to Directives can be raised by individuals before
national courts.68
Finally, the reason for according direct effect to Directives in the estoppel
argument. Given that the peremptory force of Directives would be weaken if
individuals could not rely on them before national courts,69 a Member State
                                                
67 Paul Craig, Directives: Direct effect, Indirect effect and the Construction of National
Legislation, ELRev., 1997, p. 519.
68Paul Craig & Grainne De Burca, supra  note 11, Chapter 4 &5.
69In Case 41/71 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR 1337, [1975] 1 CMLR 1, para12, the
Court also stated that :
“In particular, where the Community authorities have, by directive, imposed on member
states the obligation to pursue a particular course of conduct, the useful effect of such an
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which has not implemented the directive ‘may not rely, as against individuals, on
its own failure to perform the obligation which directive entail’70. Provided,
therefore, that the directive is sufficiently precise, the basic obligation is
unconditional and that the period for implementation has passed, and individual
can derive enforceable rights from a directive.71
However, the ECJ also held that Directives only have vertical as opposed to
horizontal direct effect. Treaty articles and regulations give individuals rights
which can be used both against the States (vertical direct effect), and against
private parties (horizontal direct effect), but Directives only have vertical direct
effect. The authority for the limitation of direct effect was the Marshall case72
and it was reaffirmed by the ECJ’s ruling in Dori.73 In case Marshall, the court
stated explicitly that “a provision of a directive may not itself impose on an
individual” and that “a provision of a directive may not be relied on as such
against such a person”.74 The ECJ has also proffered many arguments to justify
its rulings for not having horizontal direct effect of Directives.75
The doctrine of direct effect has been an essential component in advancing the
effectiveness of Community law.76 It allows EU nationals to bring suits based on
Community law in National courts. The function of direct effect is that EC law is
to be considered by National courts as a source of law to be applied to
individual cases and controversies. Commenting on the importance of direct
effect, notable Scholar Joseph Weiler has stated:
“The implications of this doctrine were and are far reaching. The European
Court reversed the normal presumption of public international law whereby
international legal obligations are result-oriented and addressed to states…
The main import of the Community doctrine of direct effect was not simply the
conceptual change it ushered forth. In practice direct effect meant that
Member States violating their obligations could not shift the locus of dispute to
the Interstate or Community plane. They would be faced with legal actions
before their own courts at the suit of individuals within their own legal order…
                                                                                                                           
act would be weaken if individuals were prevented from relying on it before their national
courts and if the later were prevented from taking it into consideration as an element of
Community law”
70 Case 148/78 Pubblico Ministero v. Ratti [1979] ECR 1269, para. 22.
71 Paul Craig, supra  note 67, p. 520. See also Case 41/71 Van Duyn v. Home Office [1974] ECR
1337, [1975] 1 CMLR 1.
72 Case 152/84 Marshall v. Southampton & South West Hampshire Area Health Authority
[1986] ECR 723.
73 Case C-91/92 Dori v. Recreb [1994] ECR I-3325.
74 In Case 80/86 Kolpinghiuis [1987] ECR 3969, para 48 the Court stated that ”a member state
can not rely on the direct effect of a (non-implemented) directive in criminal proceedings
against an individual”. See further, Case 14/86 Pretore de salò v. X [1987] ECR 2545.
75 The Court based its justification on the four arguments: the textual argument; publication
and the rule of law argument; the distinction between regulations and directives argument;
and the legal certainty argument. See the analysis of Paul Craig, supra  note 67, p. 519.
76 Pescatore, P., The Doctrine of Direct Effect: An Infant Disease in Community Law, 1983, 8
ELRev.155.
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Effectively, individuals in real cases and controversies (usually against state
public authorities) become the principal ‘guardians’ of legal integrity of
Community law within Europe.”77
However, the distinction between vertical and horizontal direct effect of
Directives has created a potential gap in the effectiveness of Community law and
in its protection of individuals. EU citizens may only rely on the directly effective
of Directives before national courts when the action is against a Member State.78
As a result, significant gaps exist where direct effect ceases to protect individuals.
Furthermore, for various reasons, not all Community provisions have direct
effect. In this situation, the enforcement of Community law is left exclusively to
Member States which can easily circumvent EC provisions. That why the ECJ
has created the indirect effect doctrine that we are going to analyze below.
2.5 Indirect Effect: The Interpretative Duty of
National Courts
The term “indirect effect” is a handy label for the doctrine that Community
provisions, even if not directly effective, must be taken into account by national
court when interpreting national legislation.79 The doctrine of indirect effect was
developed by the ECJ against the backdrop of the denial of horizontal direct
effect of Directives. Therefore, it is applied mainly to Directives which can not be
directly imposed obligation on individuals.80 This doctrine originated in the Von
Colson case81. The Case concerned a Council directive on sex discrimination82,
in which a German prison denied two women, Von Colson and Kamann,
employment because they were women and instead hired lesser-qualified men.
Von Colson and Kamann brought an action against the State of Nordrhein-
Westfalen by relying on the Council Directive. The Arbeitsgericht Hamm
(Labor Court of Hamm) found discrimination but limited the women’s damages
based on the German Civil Code to implement the Directive in Germany. In one
of the reference questions to the ECJ, the German Court asked whether the
Council Directive was capable of directly effective or not. The ECJ found itself
unable to hold that the Directive was sufficiently precise and unconditional to have
direct effect, it nonetheless held that:
                                                
77 Joseph H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L. J. 2403, 1991.
78 Craig, P. P., Once upon a Time in the West: Direct Effect and the Federalization of EEC
Law, 1992, 12 OJLS 453.
79 T. C. Hartley, supra note 4, p. 222.
80 In Grimaldi, Case C-322/88 [1989] ECR 4407, the ECJ held that Recommendations, which
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to any Community instrument that is not directly effective.
81 Case 14/83 Von Colson and Kamunn v. Land Nordhein – West Falen [1984] ECR 1891.
82 Directive 76/207/EEC 9 of February 1976.
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“It is for the national court to interpret and apply the legislation adopted for the
implementation of the directive in conformity with the requirements of
Community law, in so far as it is given discretion to do so under national
law”83.
It meant that national courts had an obligation to interpret national law so as to be
in conformity with the Directive. The purpose of the Directive was to provide an
effective remedy in case of discrimination, and if states chose to fulfil this aim
through the provision of compensation then this should be adequate in relation to
damage which had been suffered. National courts should, therefore, construe their
own national law with this in mind.84
The doctrine of indirect effect was also applied to national legislation not adopted
to implement Directives, indeed, which was passed before the directive. This was
the Case Marleasing85 concerning the Council Directive 68/151, which
contained rules on safeguards for the establishment of companies within the
Community. The plaintiff claimed that one of the defendant companies had been
established “without cause” and that the purpose behind its establishment was to
perpetrate a fraud. The plaintiff sought a declaration that the contract establishing
this defendant corporation should be held to be void, based on a provision of
Spanish law. The defendant resisted the claim on the ground that Article 11 of
Directive 68/151, which lists the grounds on which the nullity of a company may
be ordered, did not include lack of cause amongst these grounds. The Directive
had not yet been implemented in Spain. The Spanish court asked the ECJ
whether the Directive was directly effective. As the parties to the case were all
private, this raised the question of horizontal direct effect.
The ECJ reaffirmed the ruling in Marshall86 that a directive can not impose
obligations on one private party. However, it extended the ruling in Von Colson
to say that:
“In applying national law, whether the provisions concerned pre-date or post-
date the directive, the national courts asked to interpret national law is bound
to do so in every way possible in the light of the text and the aim of the
directive to achieve the results envisaged by it and thus to comply with Article
189(3) of the Treaty”.
The judgment of the Court in this case clearly meant that in applying national law,
whether passed before or after Directives, a national court was required to
interpret national law as far as possible so as to be in conformity with the
Directives. While the ruling of the ECJ preserved its previous position, that there
is no horizontal direct effect of Directives, its finding on the interpretative duties of
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the national courts go a considerable way to according Directives a measure of
“indirect” direct effect.87 Thus although an individual can not, in a literal sense,
derive rights from a directive in an action against another individual, it is possible
to plead the directive in an action, in the manner exemplified by the defendant in
the present case. Once the directive has been placed before the national court in
this way, the interpretative obligation derived from Von Colson, and built upon in
Marleasing, come into operation. It has, moreover, been held that this
interpretative obligation operates even before the time period for the
implementation of the directive has expired.88
There seems to be no limitation in the judgment that national provisions subject to
interpretation in the light of Community should be those intended or deemed to
implement Community law. If the Court meant that result envisaged by the
directive had to be attained irrespective of whether or not there could be any
doubt as to the meaning of the national provision and irrespective of whether or
not the words of that provision could reasonably bear the meaning required by the
directive, the effect would be that, while pretending to uphold the Marshall
principle, the ECJ in fact making Directives directly effective against individuals89.
However, the application of indirect effect principle is limited by reference to
other general principles of Community legal order, such as the Prohibition on
retroactivity and the principle of legal certainty. This point was made by
Advocate General Van Gerven in Marleasing90, and is illustrated by the
judgment of the Court in Case Kolpinghuis91 where the use of principle of direct
effect would have come to conflict with the principle of nulla poena sine lege. A
national judicial could not rely upon an unimplemented directive in order to
“sharpen” existing domestic sanctions on the market of unit goods. In
Kolpinghuis, the defendant, who stocked and sold bottles of ‘mineral water’
was charged with infringing a Dutch measure which regulated the sale of goods
for human consumption. At the time of the alleged offence, the 1980 Council
Directive on marketing of mineral water had no yet been implemented in the
Netherlands, but the public Prosecutor was of the opinion that the Directive
already had the force of law at that time. The case was referred to the ECJ,
asking whether the non-implemented Directive could be relied upon by the State
against its nationals, and whether the national court was obliged or permitted to
interpret its existing national law in the light of this non-implemented Directive.
The Court, after repeating its ruling in Von Colson, stated in paragraph 14 of the
judgment that:
                                                
87Paul Craig, supra  note 67, p. 525.
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“…in applying its national legislation a court of a Member State is required to
interpret that legislation in the light of the wording and the purpose of the
Directive in order to achieve the result referred to in the first paragraph of
Article 189 of the Treaty, but a directive can not, of itself and independently
of a national law adopted by a member state for its implementation, have the
effect of determining or aggravating the liability of persons who act in
contravention of the provision of that directive”.
It means that where an interpretation of domestic law would run counter to the
legitimate expectations of individuals, the Von Colson principle will not apply. In
other words, the State can not benefit from the operation of the principle of
indirect effect.
In a recent case, Arcaro,92 the Court stated in para. 42 of the judgment that:
“However, the obligation of the national court to refer to the content of the
directive when interpreting the relevant rules of its own national law reaches a
limit where such an interpretation leads to the imposition on an individual of an
obligation laid down by a directive which has not been transposed, or, more
especially, where it has the effect of determining or aggravating, on the basic
of the directive and the absence of a law enacted for its implementation the
liability in criminal law of persons who act in contravention of that directive’s
provision”.
The ECJ had clearly meant in this statement that the limit to the interpretative
obligation is reached “where such an interpretation leads to the imposition on an
individual of an obligation laid down by a directive which has not been
transposed”. This does not seem to be just a contra legem limit based on what
the language of the domestic legislation can bear, but appears to be a limit based
on the possible impact of the interpretation.93 Indeed, the whole point of seeking
an interpretation of national law in the light of Community law, and especially in
the light of a directive, is presumably to give national law a different meaning from
that which it might otherwise have been given. In litigation between two parties
where one is seeking an interpretation in the light of a directive and other is
resisting it, interpretation in conformity with a directive will usually entail a legal
advantage for one of the parties. The limit placed on the interpretative obligation
in Arcaro, to the effect that EC does not require national law to be read in the
light of a directive where so to do would be “to impose on an individual an
obligation contained in a directive which has not been transposed”. However,
above all controversies, the doctrine of indirect effect has been accepted as one
of the solution to extend the application and effectiveness of Community law.
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2.6 The Relationship Between Direct Effect and
Indirect Effect
The doctrine of indirect effect is pivotal in picking up where direct effect leaves
off, specifically in cases where a directive is incapable of being directly effective.94
Both Von Colson and Marleasing indicate that even when a directive is not
directly effective, National authorities still have duty, under Article 5 (now 10) and
189 (now 249), to interpret national provisions intended to implement that
directive in the light of its wording and purpose. In Johnston,95 the Court
appeared to link the two concepts of direct effect and indirect effect together,
indicating that it was the first duty of National courts to seek to interpret national
law in conformity with Community law, and only if this was not possible to
enforce Community law itself in reference to national law through the doctrine of
direct effect.96 Some commentators have argued that the Marleasing judgment is
tantamount to the ECJ’s recognizing horizontal direct effect of directives.97 Others
are more cautious in their analysis.98 However what is clear that, the ECJ has
established the doctrine of indirect effect, by using the provisions of Article 5
(now 10) EC Treaty, to strengthen the effectiveness of EC law. By crafting a
specific Member States’ duty to interpret national legislation in light of Community
provisions, the ECJ has succeeded in filling a significant gap in the effectiveness of
Community law,99 where the Community provisions lack direct effect.
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3 The Supremacy of
Community law over National
law
3.1 Introduction
The affirmation and extended application of the ECJ of the principle of direct
effect, together with the wide scope of the EC Treaty, covering a number of areas
normally reserved to national law alone, have led unavoidably to a situation of
conflict between national law and EC law. In such a situation, a question of
priority is to arise and must be answered. However, the EC Treaty is silent on this
question.100 Nowhere in the constitutive Treaties is stated that the Community law
takes precedence over National law, although such a question can be derived
from the duty of Community loyalty contained in Article 5 (now 10) EC. Like the
principle of direct effect, supremacy (or primacy) had been ignored until the
foundation years of them in the 1960s in Van Gen en Loos and Costa case101
when these principles were established by the ECJ.
Although there is a close link between direct effect and supremacy, the later
principle was not dealt with by the Court in Van Gen en Loos in which direct
effect of Community law was confirmed. In fact, possible bases for the
supremacy lie in stressing either the federal or international nature of Community
legal system. The better view is probably to accept that supremacy is inherent in
the ideal of creating a new “federal-type” legal order which lies at the heart of the
project of economic integration in Europe, which has always had as its ultimate
objective a “Union of people”.102 The postulate of supremacy of Community law
over national is based on the idea of the necessary unity and effective operation of
Community law. The process of economic integration would be much less
effective if Member states were able to hinder the attainment of Community goals
by denying the superiority of Community norms.103
3.2 The Establishment and Development of the
Supremacy Principle
The opportunity for the ECJ to affirm the principle of supremacy was in the Costa
v. Enel case104. Mr. Costa refused to pay the bills of the newly created national
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Electricity Corporation Enel, and argued that the Act of Parliament of 1962, by
which the electricity has been nationalized, violated the EEC Treaty. And because
the Act nationalizing the Electricity Company was later in time than the Italian
Ratification Act, the Act incorporating EC law, therefore it was argued to take
priority. The reasoning of the ECJ in this case happened as follows:
“By contrast with ordinary international treaties, the EEC has created its own
legal system which, on the entry into force of the Treaty, became an internal
part of the legal systems of Member States and which their courts are bound
to apply.
By creating a Community of unlimited duration, having its own institutions, its
own personality, its own capacity and capacity of representation on the
international plane and, more particularly, real power stemming from a
limitation of sovereignty or a transfer of powers from the states to the
Community, the Member States have limited their sovereign rights, albeit with
limited field and have thus created a body of law which both binds their
nationals and themselves.
The integration into laws of each Member State of provisions which derive
from the Community, and more generally the terms and the spirit of the
Treaty, make it impossible for the states, as a corollary, to accord
precedence to a unilateral and subsequent measure over a legal system
accepted by them on the basis of reciprocity. Such a measure therefore can
not be inconsistent with that legal system…
The precedence of Community law is confirmed by Article 189 (now 249)
EC, whereby a regulation ‘shall be binding’ ‘and directly applicable in all
Member states’. This provision, which is subject to no reservation, would be
quite meaningless if the states could unilaterally nullify its effects by means of a
legislative measure which could prevail over Community law.
It follows from all the observation that the law stemming from the Treaty, an
independent source of law, could not, because of its special and original
nature, be overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed, without
being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal basic
of the Community itself being called into question.
The transfer by the states from their domestic legal system to the Community
legal system of the rights and obligations arising under the Treaty carries with
it a permanent limitation of their sovereign rights, against which a subsequent
unilateral act incompatible with the concept of the Community cannot prevail.”
It is clear in each argument made by the ECJ above that Community law had to
be given primacy by national courts over any incompatible national law. Above
all, what comes across most strongly in the judgment is the Court’s teleological
approach the aims of the Community and the spirit of the Treaties are constantly
emphasized, and there is a little support in the text of the Treaties for the
proposition that Community law has a ‘special and original nature’ of which
would be deprived if subsequent domestic law were to prevail. It was a bold step
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to support its conception of Community legal order by asserting that the States
had permanently limited their powers and had transferred sovereignty to the
Community institutions.105
In the case of Internationale Handelsgesellschaft106, the ECJ has gone further
to confirm the supremacy of EC law. In this case, the conflict happened between
an EC regulation107 and the provisions of German Constitution. The plaintiff
claimed the Regulation infringed, inter alia, the principle of proportionality
enshrined in the German Constitution and sought to nullify the Regulation on those
grounds. The ECJ stated that:
“Recourse to the legal rules or concepts of national law in order to judge the
validity of measures adopted by the institutions of the Community would have
an adverse effect on the uniformity and efficacy of Community law. The validity
of such measures can only be judged in the light of Community law. In fact, the
law stemming from the Treaty, an independent source of law, can not because
of its very nature be overridden by rules of national law, however frame,
without being deprived of its character as Community law and without the legal
basis of the Community itself being called into question. Therefore the validity
of a Community measure or its effect within a member state can not be
affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as
formulated by the constitution of that state or the principle of a national
constitutional structure”.108
It is clear in the ECJ’s ruling that Community law prevails over all form of national
law, including national constitutions and fundamental rights enshrined in those
constitutions. Community measures derive their validity solely from Community
law, and those the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member
State can not be affected by objections that it runs counter to either fundamental
rights as guaranteed by the constitutions of that State or the principles of a
national constitutional structure.109
Thus as far as the ECJ is concerned all EC law, whatever its nature, must take
priority over all conflicting domestic law, whether it be prior or subsequent
Community law.110 The supremacy of Community law, as continued to be
emphasized by the Court, that it was not simply a matter of theory, but was given
practical effect by all national courts in cases arising before them.111 The following
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judgment of the Court in Simmenthal II112 also confirmed the principles
established in Costa v. Enel that the supremacy of Community law logically must
limit national law making powers. It held:
“Furthermore, in accordance with the principle of the precedence of
Community law, the relationship between provisions of the Treaty and directly
applicable measures of the Institutions on the one hand and national law of
Member States on the other is such that those provisions and measures not
only by their entry into force automatically inapplicable any conflicting
provision of concurrent national law but – in so far as they are an integral part
of, and take precedence in, the legal order applicable in the territory of each
of the member state – also preclude the valid adoption of new national
legislative measures to the extent to which they would be incompatible with
Community provisions.
    Indeed any recognition that national legislative measures which encroach
upon the field within which the Community exercises its legislative power or
which are otherwise incompatible with the provisions of Community law had
any legal effect would amount to a corresponding denial of the effectiveness
of the obligations undertaken unconditionally and irrevocably by Member
States pursuant to the Treaty and would thus imperil the very foundation of
the Community”.
Simmenthal is an interesting and important case, since it spells out quite starkly
the practical implications for the Community legal order of the principle of
supremacy and direct effect.113 And that ‘a national court which is called upon,
within the limit of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law is under a
duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing of its own motion
to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation, even if adopted
subsequently, and it is not necessary for the court to request or await the prior
setting aside of such provision by legislative or other constitutional mean’.114
In practice, of course, the principle of direct effect or supremacy can be put to
effect only by the domestic institutions themselves. The ECJ has no power to
invalidate national legislation, although it may state in a preliminary ruling that
national legislation of the type at issue in a given case is inconsistent with
Community law, or make a declaration under Article 171 (now 228) EC that a
given provision of National law is incompatible with Community law. The pre-
emptive effect of Community law is particularly apparent in those areas where
Community legislature has exhaustively regulated the field, in particular using the
form of Regulations.115 In case Prantl116 the Court stated that: “once rules on the
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common organization of the market [in wine] may be regarded as forming a
complete system, the Member States no longer have competence in that field
unless Community law expressly provides otherwise”.
3.3 The Nature of Supremacy: a Duty to
Disapply
The supremacy of EC law entails duties for various national authorities.117 For the
national legislator, it implies a prohibition to adopt laws that are inconsistent with
the binding rules of Community law.118 For the National courts Simmenthal II
also tells that, they are responsible for ‘disapplying’ national law which comes
into conflict which Community law.119 In fact, the idea of disapplying national law
of national courts out come from the established case Costa120. The judgment of
the Court in this Case demonstrated that the essence of common market stands
or falls by ensuring a uniform effect of the relevant rules of Community law in
each Member State. No domestic rule can be adduced before a national court
against the law created by the Treaty (which springs from an original and
autonomous source) lest the later lose its Community character and the legal
basis of the Community itself be impaired.121 Thus, the ECJ went further in
Simmenthal to rule that it is unnecessary for the national court to request or
await the prior setting aside of national provisions that inconsistent with EC law.
In the United Kingdom, the European Community Act 1972, Section 2(4)
provides, inter alia, that any enactment passed or to be passed is to be
construed and have effect subject to the recognition of rights and obligations
flowing from Community law contained in the Act and Section 3(1) of the Act
makes it clear that the national courts must follow the principle laid down by and
the decisions of the ECJ.
Rules of Community law, therefore, have internal effect without reference to
national legal order, viz. in the area which has been created in consequence of the
limitation of national sovereignty. In other words, national constitutional law
which regard to the internal effect and the internal order of priority to be given to
rules of international law does not apply with reference to rules of Community,
because it can apply only within the limits of sovereignty. Beyond these limits, i.e.
within the Community legal order, the national courts without being hampered by
constitutional restrictions, may give to the rules of Community law the effect
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desired by the ECJ. If the national court comes across legal measures which
conflicting with Community law, it must refrain from applying them, not because
they are of lower order than Community law, but because in such a case the
national legislator has acted ultra vires.122
To say in a different way, for national courts, respecting the principle of
supremacy means that, when an EC rule applies in a given case, any conflicting
national norm should immediately be set aside. This is usually called the duty to
disapply national law.123
In the case of the United Kingdom, the idea of disapplying an Act of Parliament
is a novel concept for a UK judge, accustomed to occupying subordinate
position in relation to legislative.124 However, the ECJ made clear in its ruling on
the reference from the House of Lords in case Factortame125 that, it is inherent
to the system of Community law that national courts must be able, in either final
or interim proceedings, to issue appropriate orders to give effect to Community
law. It held that any provision of a national legal system and any legislative,
administrative or judicial practice which might impair the effectiveness of
Community law by withholding from the national court having jurisdiction to
apply such law the power to do everything necessary at the moment of its
application to set aside national legislative provisions which might prevent, even
temporarily, Community rules from having full force and effect are incompatible
with those requirements, which are the very essence of Community law…
And “it must be added that the full effectiveness of Community law would be just
as must impaired if a rule of national law could prevent the court seized of a
dispute governed by Community law from granting interim relief in order to
ensure the full effectiveness of the judgment to be given on the existence of the
rights claimed under Community law. It follows that a court which in those
circumstances would grant interim relief, if it was not a rule of national law, is
obliged to set aside the rule”.126
On these grounds the House of Lords was obliged to abrogate, at least as
regards matters of Community competence, the rule prohibiting the granting of
interim injunctions against the Crown, as it had indicated in its judgment prior to
ordering a reference that it would be it would be prepared to do if required by
the Court.127 The ECJ also held that a national court be prepared to grant such a
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remedy even in advance of an authoritative ruling by the Court on the existence
of an infringement of Community law.128
However, it is necessary to distinguish between non-application and invalidity,
since the result in practice of the operation of setting aside conflicting national law
is close to the invalidation of the rule. A national rule which is set aside for being
inconsistent with Community law, is inoperative only to the extent of this
inconsistency; the rule may continue to be applied to cases where it is not
inconsistent, or to cases which are not covered by the Community norm,129 and it
may be fully applied again if and when the Community norm ceases to exist.
Things are different only when EC law is intended to harmonize national
legislation, then inconsistencies must be removed by repealing or modifying
national law to the extent required by harmonizing act. In this case, the possible
disapplication of inconsistent national norm by the court can not be an excuse for
the legislator’s failure to change the law.130
3.4 The Scope of Supremacy
3.4.1 Absolute Supremacy
The supremacy of Community law over National law is absolute, it means that,
supreme even to national constitutions. Scholar S. Weatherill stated that
supremacy is absolute: ‘even the most minor piece of technical Community
legislation ranks above the most cherished constitutional norm’.131 In practice,
The ECJ, in its settled case law, has already given Community law absolute
supremacy over the rules of national law, even if they are constitutional. The
Court has not hesitated for its part to affirm the obligation of the Member states
to refuse to apply in any situation law which are contrary to Community
measures. In Costa132 the Court held that Community law ‘can not be
overridden by domestic legal provisions, however framed’ and ‘no domestic rule
can be adduced before a national court against the law created by the Treaty’. In
Simmenthal133 the Court implied that, if the Community provision is ‘directly
applicable’, no matter what it is Treaty provision or other Community measures,
such as regulation, decision, or directive, it will also prevail over inconsistent
national legislation.134
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The classic assertion of the full supremacy of Community law came in the
Internationale Handelsgesllschaft135 in 1970 which faced with the challenge to
the validity of a Community regulation for violation of German basic law. The
applicant, a German import-export company, obtained an export license in
respect of 20,000 metric tones of maize meal, the validity of which expired on
31/12/1967. Council Directive 120/67 had set up a system for common
organization of the cereal market, whereby a license could be obtained by
lodging a deposit, and that deposit would be forfeit if the goods were not
exported within the period of time set. A part of the applicant company’s deposit
was forfeit when the license expired without all of the maize having exported, and
the company brought proceedings before the administrative court claiming the
validity of the deposit system, since it was contrary to constitutional law. The
ECJ held that:
“Community law prevails over all forms of national law, including national
Constitutions and fundamental rights enshrined in those constitutions.
Community measures derive their validity solely from Community law, and
thus the validity of a Community measure or its effect within a Member State
can not be affected by objections that it runs counter to either fundamental
rights as guaranteed by the constitution of that state or the principles of a
national constitutional structure”.
Recently, to affirm this absolute supremacy the court stated that neither
constitutional rights nor rules of an institutional nature are allowed to hamper the
full effect of Community law.136 This scope of supremacy has been promoted for
the ‘practical’ reason that: the ECJ was given monopoly to interpret the EC
Treaty and secondary EC law, uniformity must be ensured as a top priority
through out the EU as regards the scope and meaning of EC law. Therefore there
should be no room for constitutional obstacles or reservations defines state by
state, on the basis of national constitutional jurisdiction, according to variable
criteria of national constitutional adjudication. Because the status, the unity,
uniformity and efficacy of the EC legal regime would be put in danger, if one was
allowed to review of its validity on the basis of particular national legal standards.
3.4.2 Structural Supremacy: Disapply Procedures and
Remedies in National Courts
The supremacy of the substances of Community law over National law has been
affirmed and developed by the ECJ over years. This does not mean that, to
obtain the objectives set out by the EC Treaty, EC provisions on procedures and
remedies need not to be primacy over those of the Member States, since the
principles of EC law can be put into effect only by domestic institutions
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themselves.137 Therefore, the ECJ has tended to regard national procedural law
merely as an ancillary body of law the function of which is to ensure the effective
application of substantive Community law.138 Furthermore, the substantive law
flowing from Community law is now filtered through fifteen different procedural
systems of fifteen Member States. This can lead to the risk that the ability to
invoke the Community norm may be rendered ineffective by national procedural
or remedial rules.139 Therefore, the established case-laws of the ECJ have made
clear that ‘the harmonization of legal remedies’ wanted by the Court requires
National courts to do more than just ‘set aside’ national laws.140 In fact National
courts have been supposed to assume new jurisdictional power and therefore
create new law rather than simply choose between two applicable norms.141 Or
they, in other words, have been suggested to ‘set aside’ constitutional norms
defining their jurisdictions or their powers in relation to other state authorities.
This development of a European standard with respect to judicial remedies might
perhaps be called ‘procedural’ or ‘structural’ supremacy.142 Simmenthal143 is an
early example of what we can see in the matter on remedies, i.e. how Community
law has ‘conferred’ on domestic courts, and even has required them to exercise
power and jurisdiction which they do not have under national law. The key
emphasis in these decisions is on the principle of effectiveness that: national
courts must not apply national rules which form an obstacle to the immediate
applicability or effectiveness of Community law.144 As a result, such decisions do
sometimes result in an increase in the jurisdiction and function of National courts,
even where the national jurisdictional limitations are of a constitutional nature.
The second example is the well-known Factortame case145 in the United
Kingdom. The origin of the series of cases that goes under the name Factortame
was a decision by the Community to adopt fish conservation measures. To
achieve this objective, limits were laid down to the total number of fish of various
species that could be caught in a given period. Quotas were allotted to each
member state. Certain Spanish fishermen, however, thought that they could
obtain a share of the British quota by the expedient of registering companies in
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the United Kingdom and transferring the ownership of their boats to those
companies. They claimed that since the boat were owned by British companies,
they were entitled to fly the British flag and therefore take fish from the British
quota, rather than Spanish quota. British fishermen objected this manoeuvre, and
the British government passed legislation to prevent it. The Spaniards
immediately challenged the legislation in British court and a reference was made
to the ECJ to determine whether it was contrary to Community law.
Since the ECJ normally takes between one and two years to decide such case,
the Spaniards therefore applied for an interim injunction to preclude the
Government from enforcing the British statute until the ECJ had given its ruling.
This was granted by the Divisional Court but rescinded by the Court of Appeal,
a decision upheld by the House of Lords, which ruled that, under United
Kingdom law, there was no power to grant an injunction against the Crown to
suspend the application of an Act of Parliament. The House of Lords referred to
the ECJ the question of whether Community law requires a British court to issue
a provisional injunction suspending the application of a measure alleged to violate
Community law in order to avoid irreparable injury to a complainant pending
judgment on the merits. The ECJ’s answer is affirmative. It ruled that, where, in a
case involving Community law, a national court considers that the sole obstacle
to the granting of interim relief is a rule of national law, Community law requires it
to set aside that rule.146 The Court’s decision in this case has obviously
demonstrated its willingness to require national courts to set aside a national
procedural rule even if the rule is based on important policies of the Member
State.147 The judgment of the Court in Factortame is highly significant, because
the rule to be set a side was a fundamental national rule, ranking a quasi-
constitutional norm.
In its recent decisions in van Schinjdel148 and Peterbroeck149 the Court added a
new analytical layer to its evaluation of national procedures. These decisions, it
may be argued, narrowed the range of procedural rules that remain within the
exclusive jurisdiction of national law and may have signaled the Court’s intent to
move further into the harmonization of the field of legal remedies against Member
states.150 Both cases presented challenges to procedural principles preventing the
national court from raising issues of Community law of its own motion. In van
Schinjdel, the plaintiffs challenged a Dutch law requiring certain professionals to
participate in a pension fund. When their case reach the Supreme Court of the
Netherlands (Hoge Raad), the plaintiff sought for the first time to rely on
Community rights. The Hoge Raad, however could not entertain the Community
law claims because Dutch procedure prevents litigants from raising new points of
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law in cassation and the Hoge Raad from raising of such points of its own motion
if doing so entails a new inquiry. In Peterbroeck, the plaintiffs unsuccessfully
challenge a tax assessment before an administrative officer based solely on
national law. They sought to rely on Community rights for the first time when
appealing the adverse administrative determination before an appellate court (the
Cour d’Appel). However, a statue of limitation barring claims made after the
expiration of a 60-day period commencing with the filing of the challenged tax
determination prevented the litigants from asserting, and the court from
considering of its own motion, the Community law claims.
The judgment of the ECJ reached opposite results in the two cases. In van
Schinjdel, the Court found the challenged procedural rule justified on the ground
that it “safeguards the rights of the defence and ensures proper conduct of
proceedings by, in particular, protecting them from the delays inherent in the
examination of new pleas”.151 In Peterbroeck, the Court found the 60-day limit
not objectionable per se, but held that its “special features” precluded its
application consistent with Community law. These special features were that the
Cour d’Appel was the first “court or tribunal” that could make a reference under
Article 177 (now 234), and the expiry of the 60-day period precluded the Cour
d’Appel and any higher court from raising the Community law issues of its own
motion and, if appropriate, make reference.152 Nonetheless, both in Peterbroeck
and Van Schijndel the Court confirmed that, in the absence of Community
procedural law, the national court apply the national rules of procedural law,
which thus become ancillary to Community law. Those rules are applicable only
insofar as they are compatible with the objective of ensuring the uniform and
effective application of Community law or, put it in another way, of safeguarding
the rights confer on litigant as the result of direct effect of Community law. They
are not compatible with that objective if they are such as to render the objective
of those rights by litigants excessively difficult in practice.153
The structural supremacy of EC law has been further confirmed by the
pronouncements of the Court relating to the need for uniformity of certain legal
procedural rules in cases brought under Community law. The Court’s case law
demonstrates that “effectiveness requires uniformity so far as the essential or
‘constitutive’ precondition of the remedies are concerned, and sufficient
comparability, through the so-called ‘bottom line’ approach, as far as other rules
are concerned.154 In fact, the Court is de facto creating a European law of
procedures each time it rejects a national procedural provision as incompatible
with effective judicial protection or effet utile.155
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The theme of unification of remedies was also sounded by the ECJ in cases such
as Francovich156 and Brasserie du Pêcheur157. Thus the Court held in
Francovich that the principle of Member State liability for breach of Community
law is ‘inherent in the Treaty’, and therefore asked national courts to apply a
Community rule that necessary must be uniform throughout the Union. In
Brasserie du Pêcheur, the Court was asked to specify the “condition under
which a right to reparation of loss or damage caused to individuals by breaches
of Community law attributable to a Member state is guaranteed by Community
law. After restating the familiar principle that these conditions should be
determined in the light of the doctrines of effective judicial protection and effet
utile, the Court moved on to the unification concept and held that the conditions
for state liability “can not, in the absence of particular justification, differ from
those governing liability of the Community in like circumstances”.158
The feeling of high spirits of the Factortame/Francovich era has become less
intense somewhat today. There is a limit to what the supremacy principle can
achieve in this respect: “the idea that the principle of supremacy can be invoked to
sweep aside all national rules which stand in its way appears to be based on a
utopian idea of litigation. The belief that the “correct” result should be reached as
a matter of Community law in every case treats litigation like an academic puzzle,
rather than means for resolving a dispute which arising between two parties”.159
The road forward may be that, where a remedial deficit is found to exist, the
Community legislator should take specific measures geared to the problems in a
particular area of the law, and perhaps, in some more distant future, a more
general effort to harmonize national procedural laws could be undertaken.160
Anyhow, Community law has its own particular needs. It may be reasonably
expected, therefore, that even after harmonization has been introduced, there will
still be procedural rules requiring to be adapted to the needs of substantive
Community law.161 It is interesting to observe that there are a growing number of
rules of secondary Community law ‘governing’ procedures and remedies, that are
usually adopted to accompany substantive rules of Community law in a particular
sector.162
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3.4.3 Supremacy: a Duty to Disapply for Administrative
Authorities
In the process of giving effect to Directives, the ECJ has broadened the concept
of “State” which is under the obligation to apply Community law. In Marshall163,
Advocate General Slynn stated that “what constitutes the ‘state’ in a particular
national legal system must be a matter for the national court to decide.
However…as a matter of Community law, where the question of an individual
relying upon the provisions of a directive as against the state arises, I consider
that the ‘state’ must be taken broadly, as including all the organs of state…”.
Following this opinion, the ECJ has held that direct effect does not simply
operate to give a legal instrument to the affected individual before a national
court, but also that state organs and domestic administrations, which play no part
in the formal implementation of European legislation are bound to apply
provisions of Directives in practice.164
More recently in Costanzo165 the ECJ held that:
“It is important to note that the reason for which an individual may, in the
circumstances described above, rely on the provisions of a directive in
proceedings before national courts is that the obligations arising under those
provisions are binding upon all the authorities of the Member States.
It would, moreover, be contradictory to rule that an individual may rely upon
the provisions of a directive which fulfil the conditions defined above in the
proceedings before the national courts seeking an order against the
administrative authorities, and yet to hold that those authorities are under no
obligation to apply the provision of the directive and refrain from applying
provisions of national law which conflict with them. It follows that when
the conditions under which the court has held that individuals may rely on the
provisions of a directive before the national courts are met, all organs of the
administration, including decentralized authorities such as municipalities, are
obliged to apply those provisions”.166 (Emphasis added)
The rulings of the Court mean that, the duty to apply directly effective EC law
provisions rest not only on national courts but also on national administrative
authorities. It has now long clearly accepted that Community law is to be applied
by administrative tribunals as well as by the courts.167 Notably, the ECJ seems
also implicitly to mention the duty to set aside national legislation of administrative
organs, can these rulings be applied to the doctrine of supremacy (since the
relevant phrase of the judgment was not repeated by the ECJ in later cases, in
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fact it hardly had the occasion to do so)? There is no doubt that the rulings of the
Court did draw a conclusion on the substantive obligations of National
authorities. It is the duty results from general principles of Community law: a duty
not to apply any rules of national law if the result would be contrary to a rule of
Community law.
The rulings of the ECJ have been identified as a very significant ruling in
constitutional term since the executive power is normally subordinate to the
legislative.168 It would be constitutional in most, if not all, Member states if
administrative authorities started to set aside, on their own motion, legislative
norms conflicting with the constitution. Only appropriate (constitutional) courts
can do so, if at all.169 However, in the EC context, if we have to take the ruling of
the court in Costanzo seriously, administrative authorities at all levels would be
under a duty to set aside any national law conflicting with directly applicable of
Community law, even though they can not use the mechanism of Article 234 (old
177) EC Treaty to ask the Court for guidance on whether the Community norm
has direct effect and on whether there is a conflict with national law. We should
probably discern between two situations. Where Member State has been found
in breach of EC law through the procedure of Article 169 (now 226), this entails
indeed, as the ECJ held in a few judgments, ‘a prohibition having the full force of
law on the competent national authorities against applying national rule
recognized as incompatible with the Treaty’;170 and we could extend this to cases
where the inconsistency of national law has been clearly established by a
preliminary ruling of the ECJ. On the one hand, it would seem more problematic
to require national administrative authorities to identify such inconsistencies
themselves, without a prior European Court ruling, and set aside national law
which they think to be in breach of EC law. However, there is one good reason
why the ‘Costanzo mandate’, despite its constitutional enormity, should be taken
seriously even in the later case: administrative authorities may thus avoid a
‘manifest and serious breach’ of EC law giving rise to state liability in the sense of
the Brasserie du Pêcheur/Factortame III judgment.171 Let’s see the reasoning
of scholar John Temple Lang:
“If a national court has a duty under Community law to protect a Community
law right against a national authority, that authority should have protected the
right on its own initiative. The authority has a duty of its own. It does not need
to wait until it is ordered by a court to carry it out.
National law, constitutional or administrative, determines who does what in
each Member State. Community law has no thing to say on that subject. The
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duties which Community law imposes on national authorities apply to all of
them, whenever the duties are relevant to what each authority is doing. Except
for specific provisions like Article 177 (now 234), the Treaties do not
distinguish between courts and other authorities. They are, after all, a
spectrum of quasi-judicial and regulatory bodies and tribunals, which cannot
easily be classified: Community law for most purposes does not need to
distinguish between them.” 172
The above-mentioned reasoning should be understood that, the duty to set aside
national legislation which is inconsistent with EC law might not only be imposed
on national courts but also national administrations, if it is necessary to protect a
Community law right. This seems to be a reasonable way to ensure the uniform
application of Community law by all Member State authorities, thus create
advantageous conditions for the European integration. However, the idea should
be stated explicitly and elaborated by the European Court or EC legislation to
trace the way for the Member States to follow.
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4 National Law and the
Acceptance of Community
Principles
The two principles of direct effect and supremacy adopted by the ECJ naturally
favor Community law. In order to achieve the greatest effectiveness of
Community law, Member States and their competent organs must accept the
Community mandate. The ECJ has stated that ‘the success of Community law in
embedding itself so thoroughly in the legal life of the Member States is due to its
having been perceived, interpreted and applied by the nationals, the
administrations and the courts, and tribunals of all the Member States as a uniform
body of rules upon which individuals may rely in their national courts.’173 By this
statement the Court has accepted that the crucial element for the effective
application of the principle of direct effect and supremacy is the attitude of
national courts and authorities.174 As a result, there is a second dimension to the
relationship between EC law and National law, which is decisive for determining
whether the Court’s doctrines have an impact on legal reality: the attitude of
National authorities. In this part, we shall briefly consider the acceptance of
Member States of the Community’s principles.
4.1 The Acceptance of the Direct Effect
Doctrine
Despite the status of unwritten principle of law,175 direct effect has been easily
accepted in most of the Member States, though there were some resistance. The
first resistance displayed by the intervening governments in Van Gen en Loos
was not mirrored by the attitudes of national courts in the following years.176 In
1967, the German Bundesfinanzhof reacted critically to the Lütticke177
Judgment of the ECJ which had recognized the direct effect of Article 95 (now
90) EC Treaty, and referred the issue to the ECJ for reconsideration. The
Financial Supreme Court complaint about the thousands of cases with which the
German financial courts had been faced as a result of Lütticke, and argued that
both Van Gen en Loos and Lütticke were utterly unconvincing ‘political’
decisions.178 However, the ECJ did not consider its early views179 and the dispute
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petered out. The further reaction against this principle was only with respect to
one particular of Community acts, namely Directives. The direct effect of
Directives was not smoothly accepted by the Member States as those of Treaty
provisions and Regulations. In Cohn-Bendit180 and Kloppenburg,181 the French
Conseil d’Etat and the German Bundesfinanzhof were unwilling to accept that
Directives could give rise to rights justiciable at the instance of individuals. The
national courts’ reasoning in all these cases ran on the similar line that Article 189
(now 249) expressly distinguished between Regulations and Directives. Only
regulations are described as directly applicable; directives are intended to take
effect within the national order by means of national implementing measures.
However, the effectiveness argument advance by the ECJ is compelling.
Moreover, the controversy on the direct effect of directives seemed to be
balanced by the Court’s refusal to recognize the horizontal direct effect of
Directives, though not much convincible.182 Apart from these early and short-lived
‘rebellion’, the principle that Community law can have direct effect has not been
contested anywhere.183 Now, the direct effect of EC law has developed from an
“infant disease” to be recognized as a part of the “new legal order” of the
Community that confers rights on individuals.
4.2 The Acceptance of the Principle of
Supremacy
A little bit different from direct effect, supremacy was more slowly and reluctantly
accepted, even in the founder Member States.184 The very reason for this is that
supremacy of EC law may affect the principle of national sovereignty and the
guarantees of fundamental human rights. Among original six, no special efforts
were required from the courts in the Netherlands and Luxembourg, where the
supremacy of international treaty provisions over national legislation was accepted
prior to 1957. Of the other four countries, the courts in Belgium reacted most
promptly and loyally to the ECJ’s injunctions. Although the Belgium Constitution
was silent on the domestic effect of international or European law, the Supreme
court adopted the principle of primacy as it had been formulated in Costa, and
based it on the nature of international law and of EC law. The other Belgian
courts soon followed the same line.
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In France, although the text of Article 55 of the Constitution recognized the
priority of international treaties even over later French laws, the courts were
surprisingly slow to accept that this constitutional provision could actually be used
as a conflict rule in real cases and controversies. The French judicial system is
divided between the administrative courts and the ordinary courts. The Cour de
Cassation, taking the lead of all ordinary courts, decided to cross the Rubicon in
the 1975 Cafés Jacques Vabre judgment185, in which the supremacy of
Community law over French law was accepted. The Conseil d’Etat, the
Supreme Administrative Court, followed suit much later with the Nicolo decision
(1989), after what must have been a very painful revision of established truths.186
Since this decision, the Conseil d’Etat has recognized the priority of both
Community regulations and directives over French statues, without discussing the
theoretical basis for that supremacy, and the French Constitution has been
amended to give effect to changes made by the TEU, so that ‘the Community is
now placed on a clearer constitutional footing in France’.187
In Italy and Germany, the acceptance of the supremacy of EC law is not easy,
since their Constitutions  have given significantly more protection to fundamental
human rights than those of the other Member States.188 Fundamental rights are
higher legal norms than all others applicable in the national legal systems and so
provisions of law conflicting with fundamental rights provision may be set aside as
unconstitutional. This position is potentially in conflict with the principle of
supremacy of Community law, since a national court finding that a directly
applicable measure of Community law infringed a national constitutional
fundamental rights provision would be obliged to set aside the Community law.
Therefore, the actual duties imposed on national courts by Costa went well
beyond what the mainstream constitutional doctrine, at that time, was prepared to
accept in term of the domestic force of international treaty law.189
In Germany, the Bundesverfassungsgericht (Constitutional Court) originally
adopted a position that where there is a conflict between guarantees of
fundamental rights in the Constitution and in Community law, the fundamental
rights prevail, so long as the European institutions have not resolved the
conflict.190 The ECJ responded to this position with the assurance that
fundamental rights were already protected in Community law as general principles
of law.191 So, the Bundesverfassungsgericht has subsequently modified its
position by confirming that so long as the European institutions, and in particular
the ECJ in its case law, generally ensure effective protection of fundamental rights
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similar to that guaranteed under German Constitution, then it will no longer
examine the compatibility of Community legislation with fundamental rights.192
In Italy, the message, in Costa, was primarily addressed to the Italian
Constitutional Court. This Court although has gradually come to recognize the
supremacy of Community law over national legislation, but still had some
reservations towards the concept of supremacy of Community law, in particular
supremacy over national fundamental rights provision. In Frontini,193 the Corte
Costituzionale (Italian Constitutional Court) while confirming that, in general,
provisions of Community law have ‘full compulsory efficacy and direct
application’ in Italy, held that if a Community provision should violate fundamental
constitutional or human rights principles the Corte Costituzionale would ensure
that Community law was compatible with those principles. In the more recent
case of Granital,194 the Corte Costituzionale  expressly affirmed the principle of
supremacy of EC law, but still reiterated its caveat from Frontini concerning
review of Community provisions in terms of their consistency with fundamental
rights protections.
For the nine countries joined the European Community after Costa, the situation
was rather different. For them, supremacy and direct effect did not require ex
post constitutional creativity but was a matter of voluntary acceptance as acquis
communautaire. Greece and Ireland, when they joined had put their
constitutions in order. Article 28 of the Greek Constitution, adopted prior to
accession, recognizes the primacy of international conventions over any national
legislation. In Ireland, given the inability of the dualist constitutional tradition to
cope with the demands of membership, a special EC law was added to the
Constitution vouchsafing the direct effect and primacy of Community law. In Pigs
and Bacon Commission,195 it was held that Community law takes legal effect in
the Irish system in the manner in which Community law itself provides. So, since
Community law provides for supremacy of Community provisions, Irish courts
must give effect to that rule.
In the United Kingdom, the reluctance of the courts to alter their long-standing
deference the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament inevitably led to difficulty
with UK compliance with Community law. In fact, the question of supremacy
floated around for many years until the Factortame II judgment,196 where the
House of Lords for the first time disapply the later Act of Parliament for being
inconsistent with the EEC Treaty. It is still discussed whether the House of Lords
decided on the basis of sophisticated statutory construction or recognized a
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genuinely new constructional rule, giving priority to Community law over any type
of national law, but the later view seems more convincing, also in the light of later
UK case law.197 Nevertheless, the judgment of Lord Bridge that “it has always
been clear that it was the duty of a United Kingdom court… to override any rule
of national law found to be in conflict with any directly enforceable rule of
Community law”198, is evidence that, in some circumstances, the UK courts will
now recognize the supremacy of Community law explicitly and directly. And now,
we can affirm that, supremacy of Community law over national legislation and
sources of national law lower in rank than legislation,199 seems to be accepted in
most of the Member States.200 Supremacy and direct effect were to be
recognized because the EC Treaty was unlike other international treaties. And,
EC law is now often presented as being unique because it is endowed with direct
effect and supremacy.201 However, direct effect and supremacy of EC law have
not been completed. In 1950, while writing about the domestic status of
international treaties, Morgenstern stated: ‘only the full integration of international
society, by giving international law the means of enforcing its authority directly
within the state, can establish the supremacy of international law in its fullest
sense”.202 EC law now is only halfway on the road traced by Morgenstern.
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5 Conclusion
The key to an understanding of the effect of the European Community law in the
Member States, and consequently its enforcement at the suit of individuals, is the
relationship between Community law and National law. It can hardly be denied
that the Community now exercises considerable substantive powers which the
Member States no longer exercise or lay claim to exercise – the exceptional cases
being so infrequent as to be regarded as major crises. Where Common
organizations of the market should exist, national market organizations are no
longer specially protected against the rigors of the basic Treaty rules.203 Over the
past forty years, the Community has grown into a unique organization, much of
the success of the European integration must be attributed to the ECJ.
Nevertheless, due to its singular nature, the Community faces a number of
problems when ensuring proper implementation and enforcement of Community
rules. The European Court has remedied these problems with its most important
judicial creation – the doctrine of direct effect and supremacy. Having been
allowed to invoke Community provisions before national courts, individuals have
been made a direct participant in the European integration process, thanks, in
large part, to the principle of direct effect and supremacy.204
Indeed, in the first decades after Van Gen en Loos and Costa judgments, one of
their main consequences was to transform state duties in the economic sphere into
individual rights, thus allowing private parties ‘to drive forward the process of
market integration.’205 By this way, the ECJ has also provided an enforcement
mechanism in addition to Article 169 (now 226) and 170 (now 227) EC. The
limitation of direct effect has also been made up by the ECJ in the doctrine of
indirect effect, and therefore, the effectiveness of Community law has been
strengthened considerably. In describing the relationship between EC law and
Member State law, in which powers once exercised by Member States are now
exercised by the Community, it is appropriate to say that sovereignty has been
transferred to the Community,206 of course in specific fields. Besides, the
principles of direct effect and supremacy, as presently formulated and accepted,
continue to confirm the nature of EC law as that of a branch of international law,
albeit a branch with some unusual, quasi-federal, blossoms.207 As far as other
issues of enforcement of Community law, such as indirect effect, status of national
procedures and remedies are concerned, the relationship between Community
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law and national law remains very much a live issue.208 Thus, the question of the
legal status of norms of European Community law within the legal order of the
Member States of the European Union is an evergreen in European legal
studies.209 As a result, direct effect, supremacy of Community law, especially the
matter of horizontal direct effect of Directives and supremacy of Community law
over National constitutions, continue to be a sensitive and controversial issue in
academy and practical application of EC law.
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